The high cost of last-minute election overhauls
Just months before the 2026 midterms, election officials across the country are being asked to do something that every experienced administrator dreads: make major changes to election systems at the last minute.
Recent court rulings and federal proposals have triggered a wave of potential operational overhauls, forcing state and local officials to contemplate complex technology modifications, redrawing of voting precincts, modification of mail ballot procedures and other last-minute changes to election rules, just months before the midterms.
Public debate, understandably, largely focuses on the politics and legality of these changes. But too often overlooked is a practical reality: The execution of any such modifications is reliant on people, technology and infrastructure. Building, testing and implementing new systems — and training election workers and educating voters on a compressed timeline — increases the risk of operational errors, technical failures and voter confusion. We know this from deep experience as former election officials who have worked at the local, state and federal levels, from different states and opposite sides of the political aisle.
Redrawing of congressional districts usually follows the census every ten years, but in the last year, several states, beginning with Texas and then California, have pursued mid-cycle redistricting. In April, the Supreme Court issued its Louisiana v. Callais decision, weakening Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and making it easier for states to create gerrymandered districts. The ruling unleashed a last-minute scramble by some states to alter their congressional boundaries ahead of the midterms, including Florida, where its courts have approved a highly contested, last-minute congressional map to be used this November.
For technical teams and election administrators, redrawing a congressional map is far more complicated than moving a line on a screen. When boundaries shift, administrators must completely reprogram geographic information systems and voter registration databases. Every affected voter must be reassigned to the proper district and re-coded to ensure they receive the correct local, state and federal candidates on their ballot.
These tasks take time. Compressing them into a few months leaves less time for critical security testing, logic and accuracy checks, and system audits. This is particularly onerous for the many election offices with limited staff and tight budgets. Even worse, some states have bifurcated or are considering bifurcating their primary elections into two dates, which would mean programming, testing, securing and deploying election systems twice — doubling workloads and costs. Even if administrators were given enough time to conduct voter outreach and perfectly implement their systems, voters are unsettled when they don’t see who they expect on their ballots — and in the current moment, they may fear wrongdoing where none exists.
Another major potential challenge comes from last-minute proposed changes to voting by mail. The Postal Service has proposed a rule that would allow it to reject delivery of certain election mail, attempting to execute portions of an executive order from March. The proposed rule seeks a historic role reversal, shifting the Postal Service from a neutral carrier to a federal gatekeeper for the casting of ballots, in violation of Article I section 4 of the Constitution.
Last Thursday, a federal court rightly blocked key portions of this executive order as unconstitutional — at least for the 23 states, and District of Columbia, that brought the lawsuit. Hopefully this decision will survive appeal. If not, once again, it would be government officials who would shoulder the burden, and voters who would suffer the consequences. The draft rule, if enacted, would require state and local officials to create, alter and test new systems and workflows, ensure sensitive data protection, redesign and reprint ballot envelopes, train staff and educate millions of voters, all within a few months and with no funds appropriated for the task.
Implementing a major overhaul just months before an election presents an extraordinary risk of failure and confusion. This is why courts established the core legal doctrine known as the Purcell principle. Originating from the 2006 case Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Supreme Court recognized that election rules and district maps should not be altered on the eve of an election. The rationale behind the principle is operational. Last-minute changes to procedures greatly increase the likelihood of logistical instability.
Running an election isn’t like downloading an automatic update on a smartphone; there is no magic “undo” button when a rushed database modification crashes a voter portal, or when voters receive conflicting information about where and when to vote. Stable, predictable rules are the foundation of fair elections and are critical to public confidence. Election laws can and should periodically evolve, but with sufficient time for planning, testing, training and voter education.
For the sake of our voters — and for the dedicated public servants who administer our elections — we must heed the Purcell doctrine and stop moving the goalposts when the game is already underway. The greatest casualty of last-minute election changes may be the loss of public confidence in government itself.
Kathy Boockvar is president of Athena Strategies and a senior adviser to the Institute for Responsive Government. She has decades of election security expertise. She has served as Pennsylvania’s secretary of the commonwealth, as vice president of election operations at the Center for Internet Security, and as a poll worker and voting rights attorney.
Pam Anderson is senior adviser to the League of Conservative Election Professionals. She has served as an election official and policy and administration expert for more than 23 years, as a municipal clerk, Jefferson County clerk and recorder, and as the GOP nominee for Colorado Secretary of State.
